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Abstract
We propose a model of inter-bank lending and borrowing which takes into account clear-
ing debt obligations. The evolution of log-monetary reserves of N banks is described by
coupled diffusions driven by controls with delay in their drifts. Banks are minimizing their
finite-horizon objective functions which take into account a quadratic cost for lending or
borrowing and a linear incentive to borrow if the reserve is low or lend if the reserve is high
relative to the average capitalization of the system. As such, our problem is an N-player
linear-quadratic stochastic differential game with delay. An open-loop Nash equilibrium is
obtained using a system of fully coupled forward and advanced backward stochastic dif-
ferential equations. We then describe how the delay affects liquidity and systemic risk
characterized by a large number of defaults. We also derive a close-loop Nash equilibrium
using an HJB approach.
Keywords: Systemic risk, inter-bank borrowing and lending, stochastic game with delay,
Nash equilibrium.
1 Introduction
In Carmona et al. [2015], we proposed a stochastic game model of inter-bank lending and bor-
rowing where banks borrow from or lend to a central bank with no obligation to pay back their
loans and no gain from lending. The main finding was that in equilibrium, the central bank is
acting as a clearing house, liquidity is created, thus leading to a more stable system. Systemic
risk was analyzed as in Fouque and Sun [2013] in the case of a linear model without control.
Systemic risk being characterized as the rare event of a large number of defaults occurring when
the average capitalization reaches a prescribed level, the conclusion was that inter-bank lending
and borrowing leads to stability through a flocking effect. For this type of interaction without
control, we also refer to Fouque and Ichiba [2013], Garnier et al. [2013a] and Garnier et al.
[2013b].
In order to make the toy model of Carmona et al. [2015] more realistic, we introduce delay
in the controls. This forces banks to take responsibility for past lending and borrowing. In this
∗ORFE, Bendheim Center for Finance, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544. rcarmona@princeton.edu.
†Department of Statistics & Applied Probability, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-3110,
fouque@pstat.ucsb.edu. Work supported by NSF grant DMS-1409434.
‡Department of Statistics & Applied Probability, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-3110,
mousavi@pstat.ucsb.edu
§Institute of Statistics, National Central University, Chung-Li, Taiwan 32001, lihsiensun@ncu.edu.tw. Work
supported by MOST-103-2118-M-008-006-MY2.
1
paper, the evolution of the log-monetary reserves of N banks is described by a system of delayed
stochastic differential equations, and banks try to minimize their costs or maximize their profits
by controlling the rate of borrowing or lending. They interact via the average capitalization
meaning that banks consider this average as a critical level to determine borrowing from or
lending to the central bank.
We identify open-loop Nash equilibria by solving fully coupled forward and advanced back-
ward stochastic differential equations (FABSDEs) introduced by Peng and Yang [2009]. Our
conclusion is that the new effect created by the need to pay back or receive refunds due to the
presence of the delay in the controls, reduces the liquidity observed in the case without delay.
However, despite these quantitative differences, the central bank is still acting as a clearing
house. A closed-loop Nash equilibrium to this stochastic game with delay is derived from the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation approach using the results in Gozzi et al. [2009] and
we provide a verification Theorem.
For a general introduction to BSDEs, stochastic control and stochastic differential games
without delay, we refer to the recent monograph Carmona [2016]. Stochastic control problems
with delay have been studied from various points of view. When the delay only appears in the
state variable, solutions to delayed optimal control problems were derived from variants of the
Pontryagin-Bismut-Bensoussan stochastic maximum principle. See for instance Øksendal and
Sulem [2001] and Øksendal et al. [2011]. Alternatively, in order to use dynamic programming,
Larssen [2002] and Larssen and Risebro [2003] reduce the system with delay to a finite-dimension
problem, but still the delay does not appear in the control like in the case we want to study.
The general case of stochastic optimal control of stochastic differential equations with delay
both in the state and the control is studied using an infinite-dimensional HJB equation in Gozzi
and Marinelli [2006], and Gozzi et al. [2009]. The case with pointwise delayed control is studied
in Gozzi and Masiero [2015]. The general stochastic control problem in the case of delayed states
and controls both appearing in the forward equation is studied in Chen and Wu [2011], Chen
et al. [2012] and Xu [2013] by using the forward and advanced backward stochastic equations.
Linear-Quadratic mean field Stackelberg games with delay and with a major player and many
small players are studied in Bensoussan et al. [2016].
The typical problem studied in this paper can be described as follows. The dynamics of
the log-monetary reserves of N banks are given by the following coupled diffusion processes X it ,
i = 1, · · · , N ,
dX it =
(
αit − αit−τ
)
dt+ σdW it , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (1)
where W it , i = 1, · · · , N are independent standard Brownian motions, and the rate of borrowing
or lending αit represents the control exerted by bank i on the system. In this example, we use
the simplest possible form of delay, the delayed control αit−τ corresponding to repayments after
a fixed time τ such that 0 ≤ τ ≤ T . We shall use deterministic initial conditions given by
X i0 = ξ
i, and αit = 0, t ∈ [−τ, 0). (2)
For simplicity, we assume that the banks have the same volatility σ > 0. In what follows we use
the notations X = (X1, · · · , XN), x = (x1, · · · , xN ), α = (α1, · · · , αN ), and x = 1
N
∑N
i=1 x
i.
Before concentrating on the specific case (1), we prove a dedicated version of the sufficient
condition of the Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle for a more general class of models for
which the dynamics of the states are given by stochastic differential equations of the form:
dX it =
(∫ τ
0
αit−sθ(ds)
)
dt+ σdW it , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (3)
where θ is a nonnegative measure on [0, τ ]. The special case (1) corresponds to θ = δ0 − δτ .
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Bank i chooses its own strategy αi in order to minimize its objective function of the form:
J i(α) = E
{∫ T
0
fi(Xt, α
i
t)dt+ gi(XT )
}
. (4)
In this paper, we concentrate on the running and terminal cost functions used in Carmona et al.
[2015], namely:
fi(x, α
i) =
(αi)2
2
− qαi(x− xi) + ǫ
2
(x − xi)2, q ≥ 0, ǫ > 0, (5)
and
gi(x) =
c
2
(
x− xi)2 , c ≥ 0, (6)
with q2 < ǫ so that fi(x, α) is convex in (x, α). Note that the case τ > T corresponds to no
repayment and therefore no delay in the equations,. The case τ = 0 corresponds to the case
with no control and therefore no lending or borrowing. The term qαi(x − xi) in the objective
function (5) is an incentive to lend or borrow from a central bank which in this model does not
make any decision and simply provides liquidity. However, we know that in the case with no
delay (Carmona et al. [2015]), in equilibrium, the central bank acts as a clearing house. We will
see in Section 6 that this is still the case with delay.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the model without delay
presented in Carmona et al. [2015]. The analysis of the stochastic differential games with delay is
presented in Section 3 where we derive an exact open-loop Nash equilibrium using the FABSDE
approach. In the process, we derive the clearing house role of the central bank in Remark 1.
Section 4 is devoted to the derivation of a closed-loop equilibrium using an infinite-dimensional
HJB equation approach with pointwise delayed control presented in Gozzi and Masiero [2015]. In
Section 5, we provide a verification Theorem. The effect of delay in term of financial implication
is discussed in Section 6 where the main finding is that the introduction of delay in the model
does not change the fact that in equilibrium, the central bank acts as a clearing house. However,
liquidity is affected by the delay time.
2 Stochatic Games and Systemic Risk
The aim of this section is to briefly review the model of inter-bank lending or borrowing without
delay studied in Carmona et al. [2015]. It is described by the model presented in the previous
section but with τ > T so that the delay term αit−τ in (1) is simply zero. The setup (4,5,6) of
the stochastic game remains the same.
The open-loop problem consists in searching for an equilibrium among strategies {αit, i =
1, · · · , N}which are adapted processes satisfying some integrability property such as E
(∫ T
0 |αit|dt
)
<
∞. The Hamiltonian for bank i is given by
Hi(x, yi, α) =
N∑
k=1
αkyi,k +
(αi)2
2
− qαi(x− xi) + ǫ
2
(x− xi)2, (7)
where yi = (yi,1, · · · , yi,N), i = 1, · · · , N are the adjoint variables.
For a given α = (αi)i=1,··· ,n, the controlled forward dynamics of the states X
i
t are given
by (1) without the delay term and with initial conditions X i0 = ξ
i. The adjoint processes
Y it = (Y
i,j
t ; j = 1, · · · , N) and Zit = (Zi,j,kt ; j = 1, · · · , N, k = 1, · · · , N) for i = 1, · · · , N are
defined as the solutions of the backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs):
dY i,jt = −∂xjHi(Xt, Y it , αt)dt+
N∑
k=1
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t (8)
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with terminal conditions Y i,jT = ∂xjgi(XT ) for i, j = 1, · · · , N where gi is given by (6). For
each admissible strategy profile α = (αi)i=1,··· ,n, standard existence and uniqueness results for
BSDEs apply and the existence of the adjoint processes is guaranteed. Note that from (7), we
have
∂xjH
i = −qαi( 1
N
− δi,j) + ǫ(x− xi)( 1
N
− δi,j).
The necessary condition of the Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle suggests that one min-
imizes the Hamiltonian Hi with respect to αi which gives:
αˆi = −yi,i + q(x− xi). (9)
With this choice for the controls αi, the forward equation becomes coupled with the backward
equation (8) to form a forward-backward coupled system. In the present linear-quadratic case,
we make the ansatz
Y i,jt = φt(
1
N
− δi,j)(Xt −X it), (10)
for some deterministic scalar function φt satisfying the terminal condition φT = c. Using this
ansatz, the backward equations (8) become
dY i,jt = (
1
N
− δi,j)(Xt −X it)
[
q(1 − 1
N
)φt − (ǫ− q2)
]
dt+
N∑
k=1
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t . (11)
Using (9) and (10), the forward equation becomes
dX it =
[
q + (1− 1
N
)φt
]
(Xt −X it)dt+ σdW it . (12)
Differentiating the ansatz (10) and identifying with the Ito’s representation (11), one obtains
from the martingale terms the deterministic adjoint variables
Zi,j,kt = φtσ(
1
N
− δi,j)( 1
N
− δi,k) for k = 1, · · · , N,
and from the drift terms that the function φt must satisfy the scalar Riccati equation
φ˙t = 2q(1− 1
2N
)φt + (1− 1
N
)φ2t − (ǫ − q2), (13)
with the terminal condition φT = c. The explicit solution is given in Carmona et al. [2015]. Note
that the form (9) of the control αit, and the ansatz (10) combine to give:
αit =
[
q + (1− 1
N
)φt
]
(Xt −X it), (14)
so that, in this equilibrium, the forward equations become
dX it =
(
q + (1− 1
N
)φt
)
(Xt −X it)dt+ σdW it . (15)
Rewriting (Xt −X it) as 1N
∑N
j=1(X
j
t −X it), we see that the central bank is simply acting as a
clearing house. From the form (15), we observe that the X i’s are mean-reverting to the average
capitalization given by
dXt =
σ
N
N∑
j=1
dW jt , X0 =
1
N
N∑
j=1
ξj .
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In Fouque and Sun [2013], we identified the systemic event as{
min
0≤t≤T
(Xt −X0) ≤ D
}
and we computed its probability
P
(
min
0≤t≤T
(Xt −X0) ≤ D
)
= 2Φ
(
D
√
N
σ
√
T
)
, (16)
where Φ is the N (0, 1)-cdf. This systemic risk probability is exponentially small of order
exp(−D2N/(2σ2T )) as in the large deviation estimate.
3 Stochastic Games with Delay
Most often, a tailor made version of the stochastic maximum principle is used as a workhorse
to construct open loop Nash equilibria for stochastic differential games. Here, we provide such
a tool in a more general set up than used in the paper because we believe that this result is of
independent interest on its own. We then specialize it to the model considered for systemic risk
in Section 3.3.1.
3.1 The Model
We work with a finite horizon T > 0. Recall that we denote by τ > 0 the delay length. As
explained in the introduction, the delay is implemented with a (signed) measure θ on [0, τ ], and
in the case of interest, we shall use the particular case θ = δ0 − δτ . All the stochastic processes
are defined on a probability space (Ω,F ,P) equipped with a right continuous filtration F =
(Ft)0≤t≤T . The state and control processes are denoted by X = (Xt)0≤t≤T and α = (αt)0≤t≤T .
They are progressively measurable processes with values in (Rd)N and a closed convex subset A
of (Rd)N respectively. They are linked by the dynamical equation:
dXt =< α[t], θ > dt+ σdWt (17)
where W = (Wt)0≤t≤T is a (d×N)-dimensional F-Brownian motion, σ is a positive constant or
a matrix. We use the notation α[t] = α[t−τ,t] for the restriction of the path of α to the interval
[t − τ, t]. By convention, and unless specified otherwise, we extend functions defined on the
interval [0, T ] to functions on [−τ, T + τ ] by setting them equal to 0 outside the interval [0, T ].
Also, we use the bracket notation < f, θ > to denote the integral
∫ τ
0
f(s)θ(ds).
We assume that the dynamics of the state Xt of the system are given by a stochastic
differential equation (17) which we can rewrite in coordinate form if we denote by X it the N
components of Xt, in which case we can interpret X
i
t as the private state of player i:
dX it =
(∫ τ
0
αit−sθ(ds)
)
dt+ σdW it , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (18)
where the components W it , i = 1, · · · , N of Wt are independent standard Wiener processes,
and the component processes (αit)t≥0 can be interpreted as the strategies used by the individual
players. As explained in the introduction, θ is a nonnegative measure on [0, τ ] implementing
the impact of the delay on the dynamics. Recall that the special case of interest corresponds to
θ = δ0 − δτ . We assume the initial conditions:
X i0 = ξ
i, and αit = 0, t ∈ [−τ, 0). (19)
5
The assumptions that the various states have the same volatility σ > 0 and the delay measure
θ is the same for all the players are only made for convenience. These symmetry properties are
important to derive mean field limits, but they are not really needed when we deal with finitely
many players. The objective function of player i is given by (4) which we repeat here:
J i(α) = E
{∫ T
0
fi(Xt, α
i
t)dt+ gi(XT )
}
.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the cost fi to player i depends only upon the control
αit of player i, and not on the controls α
j
t for j 6= i of the other players. In the case of games
with mean field interactions, the cost functions are often of the form fi(x, α) = f(x
i, x, α) and
gi(x) = g(x
i, x), as in the particular case of the systemic risk model studied in this paper where:
fi(x, α
i) = f(xi, x, αi) =
(αi)2
2
− qαi(x− xi) + ǫ
2
(x − xi)2,
for q ≥ 0 and ǫ > 0 as in (5), and:
gi(x) = g(x
i, x) =
c
2
(
x− xi)2 , c ≥ 0,
as in (6) and with q2 < ǫ to make sure that fi(x, α) is convex in (x, α). Next, we introduce the
system of adjoint equations.
3.2 The Adjoint Equations
For each player i and each given admissible control αi = (αit)0≤t≤T for player i, we define the
adjoint equation for player i as the Backward Stochastic Differential Equation (BSDE):
dY it = −∂xfi(Xt, αit)dt+ ZitdWt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T (20)
with terminal condition Y iT = ∂xgi(XT ), and we call the processes Y
i = (Y it )0≤t≤T and Z
i =
(Zit)0≤t≤T the adjoint processes corresponding to the strategy α
i = (αit)0≤t≤T of player i. Notice
that each Yi has the same dimension as X, namely N×d if d is the dimension of each individual
player private state X it , while each Z
i has dimension N2 × d. Accordingly, we shall use the
notation Y it = (Y
i,j
t )j=1,··· ,N where each Y
i,j
t has the same dimension d as each of the private
states Xjt , and similarly, Z
i
t = (Z
i,j,k
t )j,k=1,··· ,N . In the application of interest to us in this paper
we have d = 1.
As before, the following notation will turn out to be helpful. If Y = (Yt)0≤t≤T is a progres-
sively measurable process (scalar or multivariate) with continuous sample paths, we denote by
Y˜ = (Y˜t)0≤t≤T the process defined by:
Y˜t = E
[ ∫ τ
0
Yt+sθ(ds)
∣∣Ft] = ∫ τ
0
E[Yt+s|Ft] θ(ds), 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
Moreover, for each t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ (Rd)N and y ∈ Rd, we denote by αˆi(x, y) any α ∈ Rd satisfying:
∂αfi(x, α) = −y. (21)
Under specific assumptions the implicit function theorem will provide existence of αˆi, and reg-
ularity properties of this function with respect to the variables x and y.
6
3.3 Sufficient Condition for Optimality
Theorem 1. Let us assume that the cost functions fi are continuously differentiable in (x, α) ∈
(Rd)N ×Rd, and gi are continuously differentiable on (Rd)N with partial derivatives of (at most)
linear growth, and that:
(i) the functions gi are convex;
(ii) the functions (x, α) 7→ fi(x, α) are convex.
If α = (α1t , · · · , αNt )0≤t≤T is an admissible adapted (open loop) strategy profile, and (X,Y,Z) =(
(X1t , · · · , XNt ), (Y 1t , · · · , Y Nt ), (Z1t , · · · , ZNt )
)
are adapted process such that the dynamical equa-
tion (17) and the adjoint equations (20) are satisfied for the controls αit = αˆ
i(Xt, Y˜
i,i
t ), then the
strategy profile α = (α1t , · · · , αNt )0≤t≤T is an open loop Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We follow the proof given in Carmona [2016] in the case without delay. We fix i ∈
{1, · · · , N}, a generic admissible control strategy (βt)0≤t≤T for player i, and for the sake of
simplicity, we denote by X ′ the state X
(αˆ−i,β)
t controlled by the strategies (αˆ
−i, β). The function
gi being convex, almost surely, we have:
gi(XT )− gi(X
′
T )
≤ (XT −X
′
T ) · ∂xgi(XT )
= (XT −X
′
T ) · Y
i
T
=
∫ T
0
(Xt −X
′
t) dY
i
t +
∫ T
0
Y
i
t d(Xt −X
′
t)
= −
∫ T
0
(Xt −X
′
t) · ∂xfi(Xt, α
i
t) dt+
∫ T
0
Y
i
t · < α[t] − (αˆ
−i
, β)[t], θ > dt + martingale
= −
∫ T
0
(Xt −X
′
t) · ∂xfi(Xt, α
i
t) dt+
∫ T
0
Y
i,i
t · < α
i
[t] − β[t], θ > dt + martingale.
Notice that we can use the classical form of integration by parts is due to the fact that the
volatilities of all the states are the same constant σ. Taking expectations of both sides and
plugging the result into
J i(α)− J i((α−i,β)) = E
{∫ T
0
[fi(Xt, α
i
t)− fi(X ′t, βt)]dt
}
+ E{gi(XT )− gi(X ′T )},
we get:
J i(α)− J i((α−i,β))
≤ E
{∫ T
0
[fi(Xt, α
i
t)− fi(X ′t, βt)]dt−
∫ T
0
(Xt −X ′t) · ∂xfi(Xt, αit) dt
}
+ E
{∫ T
0
Y i,it · < αi[t] − β[t], θ > dt
}
≤ E
{∫ T
0
[αit − βt]∂αfi(Xt, αit) + Y i,it · < αi[t] − β[t], θ > dt
}
. (22)
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Notice that:
E
[ ∫ T
0
Y i,it · < αi[t] − β[t], θ > dt
]
= E
[ ∫ τ
0
(∫ T−s
−s
Y i,it+s[α
i
t − αit]dt
)
θ(ds)
]
=
∫ τ
0
∫ T
0
E[Y i,it+s[α
i
t − βt]dt θ(ds)]
=
∫ τ
0
∫ T
0
E[E[Y i,it+s|Ft][αit − βt]dt θ(ds)]
= E
[ ∫ τ
0
∫ T
0
(∫ τ
0
E[Y i,it+s|Ft]θ(ds)
)
[αit − βt]dt
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
Y˜ i,it · [αit − βt]dt
]
.
Consequently:
J i(α)− J i((α−i,β)) ≤ E
{∫ T
0
(
[αit − βt]∂αfi(Xt, αit) + Y˜ i,it · [αit − βt]
)
dt
}
= 0
by definition (21) of αˆ(t, Xˆt, Y˜
i,i
t ).
3.3.1 Example
We shall use the above result when d = 1, θ = δ0 − δ−τ so that < α[t], θ >=
∫ δ
0 αt−τ θ(dτ) =
αt − αt−δ, and the cost functions are given by (5) and (6), namely:
fi(x, α) =
1
2
α2 − qα(x − xi) + ǫ
2
(x− xi)2
for some positive constants q and ǫ satisfying q < ǫ2 which guarantees that the functions fi are
convex. Notice that relation (21) gives αˆi(x, y) = −y−q(xi−x). To derive the adjoint equations
we compute:
∂xifi(x, α) =
(
1− 1
N
)
[qα+ ǫ(xi − x)], and ∂xjfi(x, α) = − 1N [qα+ ǫ(x
i − x)],
for j 6= i. Accordingly, the system of forward and advanced backward equations identified in the
above theorem reads:{
dXit = − < Y˜
i,i
[t]
+ q(Xi[t] −X [t]), θ > dt+ σdW
i
t , i = 1, · · · , N
dY
i,j
t =
(
δi,j −
1
N
)
[qY˜ i,jt + (q
2 − ǫ)(Xit −Xt)]dt+
∑N
k=1 Z
i,j,k
t dW
k
t i, j = 1, · · · , N
(23)
where we used the Kronecker symbol δi,j which is equal to 1 if i = j and 0 if i 6= j. If we
specialize this system to the case θ = δ0 − δτ , we have Y˜ i,jt = Y i,jt − E[Y i,jt+τ |Ft], so that the
forward advanced-backward system reads:
dXit =
(
−Y i,it + Y
i,i
t−τ + E[Y
i,i
t+τ |Ft]− E[Y
i,i
t |Ft−τ ]
−q[Xit −X
i
t−τ −Xt +Xt−τ ]
)
dt+ σdW it , i = 1, · · · , N
dY
i,j
t =
(
δi,j −
1
N
)
[qY i,jt − qE[Y
i,j
t+τ |Ft] + (q
2 − ǫ)(Xjt −Xt)]dt+
∑N
k=1 Z
i,j,k
t dW
k
t
i, j = 1, · · · , N.
(24)
The version of the stochastic maximum principle proved in Theorem 1 reduces the problem
of the existence of Nash equilibria for the system, to the solution of forward anticipated-backward
stochastic differential equation. The following result can be used to resolve the existence issue
but first we make the following remark which is key in term of financial interpretation.
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Remark 1 (Clearing House Property). In the present situation, in contrast with the case
without delay presented in Section 2, we will not be able to derive explicit formulas for the
equilibrium optimal strategies such as (14). However, it is remarkable to see that the clearing
house property
∑
αi = 0 still holds. Indeed, setting i = j in (23) and summing over N to derive
an equation for Y t =
1
N
∑N
i=1 Y
i,i
t and Z
k
t =
1
N
∑N
i=1 Z
i,i,k
t , we find:
dY t = −
(
1
N
− 1
)
qY˜ tdt+
N∑
k=1
Z
k
t dW
k
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
with terminal condition Y t = 0 for t ∈ [T, T + τ ]. This equation admits the unique solution:
Y t = 0, t ∈ [0, T + τ ], and Zkt = 0, k = 1, · · · , N, t ∈ [0, T ].
and as a result,
αˆt = −Y˜ t = 0. (25)
In what follows, on the top of q2 < ǫ, we further assume that
q2(1− 1
2N
)2 ≤ ǫ(1− 1
N
), (26)
which is satisfied for N large enough, or q small enough.
Theorem 2. The FABSDE (24) has a unique solution.
Remark 2. While this theorem gives existence of open loop Nash equilibria for the model, it is
unlikely that uniqueness holds. However, the cost functions fi and gi depending only upon x
i
and x, one could consider the mean field game problem corresponding to the limit N →∞, and
in this limiting regime, it is likely that the strict convexity of the cost functions could be used to
prove some form of uniqueness of the solution of the equilibrium problem.
Proof. We first solve the system considering only the case j = i. Once this is done, we should be
able to inject the process Xt = (X
1
t , · · · , XNt ) so obtained into the equation for dY i,jt for j 6= i,
and solve this advanced equation with random coefficients.
Summing over i = 1, · · · , N the equations for X i in (23), using the clearing house property
of Remark 1, and denoting ξ = 1
N
∑N
i=1 ξ
i give
Xt = ξ +
σ
N
N∑
i=1
W it , t ∈ [0, T ]. (27)
Therefore, without loss of generality, we can work with the “centered” variables X i,ct = X
i
t −Xt,
Y i,i,ct = Y
i,i
t − Y t = Y i,it , and Zi,i,k,ct = Zi,i,kt − Z
k
t = Z
i,i,k
t which must satisfy the system:{
dX i,ct = − < Y˜ i,i[t] + qX i,c[t] , θ > dt+ σ
∑N
k=1
(
δi,k − 1N
)
dW kt ,
dY i,it =
(
1− 1
N
)
[qY˜ i,it + (q
2 − ǫ)X i,ct ]dt+
∑N
k=1 Z
i,i,k
t dW
k
t
(28)
with X i,c0 = ξ
i,c := ξi−ξ, Y i,iT = −c
(
1
N
− 1)X i,cT , and Y i,it = 0 for t ∈ (T, T+τ ] for i = 1, · · · , N .
We solve this system by extending the continuation method (see for example Peng and Wu [1999]
and Peng and Yang [2009]) to the case of stochastic games. We consider a system which is written
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as a perturbation of the previous one without delay. Since we now work with i ∈ {1, · · · , N}
fixed, we drop the exponent i from the notation for the sake of readability of the formulas.
dXλt =
[−(1− λ)Y λt − λ < Y˜ λ[t] + qXλ[t], θ > +φt]dt
+
∑N
k=1
[−(1− λ)Zk,λt + λσ(δi,k − 1N )+ ψkt ]dW kt ,
dY λt =
[−(1− λ)Xλt + λ(1− 1N )[qY˜ λt + (q2 − ǫ)Xλt ] + rt]dt+∑Nk=1 Zk,λt dW kt
(29)
with initial condition Xλ0 = ξ
i,c and terminal condition Y λT = (1− λ)XλT − λc
(
1
N
− 1)XλT + ζi,i
and Y λt = 0 for t ∈ (T, T + τ ] in the case of c > 0, and Y λT = ζi,i and Y λt = 0 for t ∈ (T, T + τ ]
in the case of c = 0.
Here (recall that i is now fixed), φt, ψ
k
t , rt are for k = 1, · · · , N , square integrable processes
which will be chosen at each single step of the induction procedure. Also ζ is a L2(Ω,FT ) random
variable. Observe that if λ = 0, the system (29) is a particular case of the system in Lemma
2.5 in Peng and Wu [1999] for which existence and uniqueness is established, and it becomes
the system (28) when setting λ = 1, ζi,i = 0, φit = 0, ψ
i,i,k
t = 0, r
i,i
t = 0, i = 1, · · · , N and
k = 1, · · · , N , for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . We only give the proof of existence and uniqueness for the solution
of the system (28) in the case of c = 0. The same arguments can be used to treat the case c > 0.
The proof relies on the following technical result which we prove in the appendix.
Lemma 1. If there exists λ0 ∈ [0, 1) such that for any ζ and φt, rt, ψkt , k = 1, · · · , N for
0 ≤ t ≤ T the system (29) admits a unique solution for λ = λ0, then there exists κ0 > 0, such
that for all κ ∈ [0, κ0), (29) admits a unique solution for any λ ∈ [λ0, λ0 + κ).
Taking for granted the result of this lemma, we can prove existence and uniqueness for (29).
Indeed, for λ = 0, the result is known. Using Lemma 1, there exists κ0 > 0 such that (29) admits
a unique solution for λ = 0+ κ where κ ∈ [0, κ0). Repeating the inductive argument n times for
1 ≤ nκ0 < 1 + κ0 gives the result for λ = 1 and, therefore, the existence of the unique solution
for (28). Since X i,ct = X
i
t −Xt, Y i,i,ct = Y i,it and Zi,i,k,ct = Zi,i,kt , and Xt is given by (27), we
obtain a unique solution (X it , Y
i,i
t , Z
i,i,k
t ) to the system (23).
4 Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) Approach
In this section, we return to the particular case θ = δ0−δτ of the drift given by the delayed control
αt−αt−τ . The HJB approach for delayed systems has been applied by Vinter and Kwong [1981]
to a deterministic linear quadratic control problem. Later, Gozzi and Marinelli [2004] followed
a similar approach for stochastic control problems. Here, we generalize the approach Gozzi and
Marinelli [2004] based on an infinite dimensional representation and functional derivatives. We
extend this approach to our stochastic game model with delay in order to identify a closed-loop
Nash equilibrium.
Note that two specific features of our discussion require additional work for our argument
to be fully rigorous at the mathematical level. First, the delayed control in the state equation
appears as a mass at time t − τ and a smoothing argument as in Gozzi and Masiero [2015]
is needed. Second, we are using functional derivatives and proper function spaces should be
introduced for our computations to be fully justified. However, since most of the functions we
manipulate are linear or quadratic, we refrain from giving the details. In that sense, and for these
two reasons, what follows is merely heuristic. A rigorous proof of the fact that the equilibrium
identified in this section is actually a Nash equilibrium will be given in Section 5.
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4.1 Infinite Dimensional Representation
Let HN be the Hilbert space defined by
H
N = RN × L2([−τ, 0];RN ),
with the inner product
〈z, z˜〉 = z0z˜0 +
∫ 0
−τ
z1(ξ)z˜1(ξ) dξ,
where z, z˜ ∈ HN , and z0 and z1(.) correspond respectively to the RN -valued and L2([−τ, 0];RN)-
valued components.
By reformulating the system of coupled diffusions (1) in the Hilbert space HN , the system of
coupled Abstract Stochastic Differential Equations (ASDE) for Z = (Z1, · · · , ZN ) ∈ HN appears
as
dZt = (AZt +Bαt) dt+GdWt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (30)
Z0 = (ξ, 0) ∈ HN .
whereWt = (W
1
t , · · · ,WNt ) is a standardN -dimensional Brownian motion and ξ = (ξ1, · · · , ξN ).
Here Zt = (Z0,t, Z1,t,r), r ∈ [−τ, 0] corresponds to (Xt, αt−τ−r) in the system of diffusions
(1). In other words, for each time t, in order to find the dynamics of the states Xt, it is necessary
to have Xt itself, and the past of the control αt−τ−r, r ∈ [−τ, 0].
The operator A : D(A) ⊂ HN → HN is defined as
A : (z0, z1(r))→ (z1(0),−dz1(r)
dr
) a.e., r ∈ [−τ, 0],
and its domain is
D(A) = {(z0 , z1 (.)) ∈ HN : z1 (.) ∈W 1 ,2 ([−τ, 0 ];RN ), z1 (−τ) = 0}.
The adjoint operator of A is A∗ : D(A∗) ⊂ HN → HN and is defined by
A∗ : (z0, z1(r))→ (0, dz1(r)
dr
) a.e., r ∈ [−τ, 0],
with domain
D(A∗) = {(w0 ,w1 (.)) ∈ HN : w1 (.) ∈W 1 ,2 ([−τ, 0 ]);RN ),w0 = w1 (0 )}.
The operator B : RN → HN is defined by
B : u→ (u,−δ−τ (r)u), r ∈ [−τ, 0],
where δ−τ (.) is the Dirac measure at −τ .
Remark 3. Note that in Gozzi and Marinelli [2004], the case of pointwise delay is not considered
as the above operator B becomes unbounded because of the dirac measure. Here, we still use the
unbounded operator B (in a heuristic sense!) and for a rigorous treatment, we refer to Gozzi and
Masiero [2015] where they use partial smoothing to accommodate the case of pointwise delay.
Finally, the operator G : RN → HN is defined by
G : z0 → (σz0, 0).
Remark 4. Let Zt be a weak solution of the system of coupled ASDEs (30) and Xt be a continu-
ous solution of the system of diffusions (1), then, with a similar line of reasoning as in Proposition
2 in Gozzi and Marinelli [2004], it can be proved that Xt = Z0,t, a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ].
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4.2 System of Coupled HJB Equations
In order to use the dynamic programming principle for stochastic games (we refer to Carmona
[2016]) in search of closed-loop Nash equilibrium, the initial time is varied. At time t ∈ [0, T ],
given initial state Zt = z (whose second component is the past of the control), bank i chooses
the control αi to minimize its objective function J i(t, z, α).
J i(t, z, α) = E
{∫ T
t
fi(Z0,s, α
i
s)dt+ gi(Z0,T ) | Zt = z
}
, (31)
In equilibrium, that is all other banks j 6= i have optimized their objective function, bank i’s
value function V i(t, z) is
V i(t, z) = inf
αi
J i(t, z, α). (32)
The set of value functions V i(t, z), i = 1, · · · , N is a solution (in a suitable sense) of the following
system of coupled HJB equations:
∂tV
i +
1
2
Tr(Q∂zzV
i) + 〈Az, ∂zV i〉+Hi0(∂zV i) = 0, (33)
V i(T ) = gi,
where Q = G ∗G, and the Hamiltonian function Hi0(pi) : HN → R is defined by
Hi0(p
i) = inf
αi
[〈Bα, pi〉+ fi(z0, αi)]. (34)
Here, pi ∈ HN and can be written as pi = (pi,1, · · · , pi,N ) where pi,k ∈ H1, k = 1, · · · , N . Given
that fi(z0, α
i) is convex in (z0, α
i),
αˆi = −〈B, pi,i〉 − q(zi0 − z¯0). (35)
Therefore,
Hi0(p) = 〈Bαˆ, pi〉+ fi(z0, αˆi),
=
N∑
k=1
〈B, pi,k〉 (−〈B, pk,k〉 − q(zk0 − z¯0))
+
1
2
〈B, pi,i〉2 + 1
2
(ǫ− q2)(z¯0 − zi0)2. (36)
We then make the ansatz
V i(t, z) = E0(t)(z¯0 − zi0)2 − 2(z¯0 − zi0)
0∫
−τ
E1(t,−τ − s)(z¯1,s − zi1,s)ds
+
0∫
−τ
0∫
−τ
E2(t,−τ − s,−τ − r)(z¯1,s − zi1,s)(z¯1,r − zi1,r)dsdr + E3(t),
(37)
where E0(t), E1(t, s), E2(t, s, r) and E3(t) are some deterministic functions to be determined.
It is assumed that E2(t, s, r) = E2(t, r, s).
Remark 5. Note that the ansatz (37) depends on z ∈ HN whose second component is the past
of all banks’ controls α. In other words, the value function V i(t, z) is an explicit function of the
past of all banks’ controls αt−τ−r, r ∈ [−τ, 0].
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The derivatives of the ansatz (37) are as follows
∂tV
i =
dE0(t)
dt
(z¯0 − zi0)2 − 2(z¯0 − zi0)
0∫
−τ
∂E1(t,−τ − s)
∂t
(z¯1,s − zi1,s)ds
+
0∫
−τ
0∫
−τ
∂E2(t,−τ − s,−τ − r)
∂t
(z¯1,s − zi1,s)(z¯1,r − zi1,r)dsdr +
dE3(t)
dt
,
(38)
∂zjV
i =
 2E0(t)(z¯0 − z
i
0)− 2
0∫
−τ
E1(t,−τ − s)(z¯1,s − zi1,s)ds
−2(z¯0 − zi0)E1(t, s) + 2
0∫
−τ
E2(t,−τ − s,−τ − r)(z¯1,r − zi1,r)dr
( 1N − δi,j
)
,
(39)
∂zjzkV
i =
[
2E0(t) −2E1(t,−τ − s)
−2E1(t,−τ − s) 2E2(t,−τ − s,−τ − r)
](
1
N
− δi,j
)(
1
N
− δi,k
)
. (40)
By plugging the ansatz (37) into the HJB equation (33), and collecting all the corresponding
terms, the following set of equations are derived for t ∈ [0, T ] and s, r ∈ [−τ, 0].
The equation corresponding to the constant terms is
dE3(t)
dt
+ (1− 1
N
)σ2E0(t) = 0, (41)
The equation corresponding to the (z¯0 − zi0)2 terms is
dE0(t)
dt
+ ǫ2 = 2(1− 1N2 )(E1(t, 0) + E0(t))2 + 2q(E1(t, 0) + E0(t)) + q
2
2 . (42)
The equation corresponding to the (z¯0 − zi0)(z¯1 − zi1) terms is
∂E1(t,s)
∂t
− ∂E1(t,s)
∂s
= 2(1− 1
N2
)
(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2(1− 1
N2
)
)
(E2(t, s, 0) + E1(t, s)) . (43)
The equation corresponding to the (z¯1 − zi1)(z¯1 − zi1) terms is
∂E2(t,s,r)
∂t
− ∂E2(t,s,r)
∂s
− ∂E2(t,s,r)
∂r
=
2(1− 1
N2
) (E2(t, s, 0) + E1(t, s)) (E2(t, r, 0) + E1(t, r)) . (44)
The boundary conditions are
E0(T ) =
c
2
,
E1(T, s) = 0,
E2(T, s, r) = 0,
E2(t, s, r) = E2(t, r, s), (45)
E1(t,−τ) = −E0(t), ∀t ∈ [0, T ),
E2(t, s,−τ) = −E1(t, s), ∀t ∈ [0, T ),
E3(T ) = 0.
Note that with these boundary conditions (at t = T ), we have V i(T, z) = gi(z0) =
c
2 (z¯0 − zi0)2,
as desired.
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Remark 6. The set of equations (41–44) on the domain t ∈ [0, T ], s, r ∈ [−τ, 0], and with
boundary conditions (45) admits a unique solution. This can be shown by following the steps of
the proof of Theorem 6 in Alekal et al. [1971] and using a fixed point argument (see also Chen
and Wu [2011]).
If all the other banks choose their optimal controls, then the bank i’s optimal strategy αˆi,
i = 1, · · · , N follows
αˆit = −〈B, ∂ziV i〉 − q(zi0 − z¯0),
= 2
(
1− 1
N
)[(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2
(
1− 1
N
)) (z¯0 − zi0)
−
∫ 0
−τ
(E2(t,−τ − s, 0) + E1(t,−τ − s)) (z¯1,s − zi1,s)ds
]
. (46)
In terms of the original system of coupled diffusions (1), the closed-loop Nash equilibrium cor-
responds to
αˆit = 2
(
1− 1
N
)[(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2
(
1− 1
N
)) (X¯t −X it)
+
∫ t
t−τ
[E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)] ( ¯ˆαs − αˆis)ds
]
, i = 1, · · · , N.
(47)
Remark 7. As pointed out in Remark 1 of Section 3, in the present situation we still have∑N
i=1 αˆ
i
t = 0 and therefore, in this equilibrium, the central bank serves as a clearing house (see
also the discussion of Section 6).
5 A Verification Theorem
In this section, we provide a verification theorem establishing that the strategies given by (47)
correspond to a Nash equilibrium. Our solution is only almost explicit because the equilibrium
strategies are given by the solution of a system of integral equations. This approach has been
used by Alekal et al. [1971] to find the optimal control in a deterministic delayed linear quadratic
control problem. Recently, Chen and Wu [2011] and Huang et al. [2012] have applied this
approach to delayed linear quadratic stochastic control problems. In this section, we generalize
it to delayed linear -quadratic stochastic games differential games.
We recall that at time t ∈ [0, T ], given x = (x1, · · · , xN ), which should be viewed as the
state of the N banks at time t, and an A-valued function α on [0, τ), which should be viewed
as their collective controls over the time interval [t − τ, t), bank i chooses the strategy αi to
minimize its objective function
J i(t, x, α, αt) = E
{∫ T
t
fi(Xs, α
i
s)ds+ gi(XT ) | Xt = x, α[t) = α
}
. (48)
Here α[t) is defined as the restriction of the path s 7→ αs to the interval [t − τ, t) and αt is an
admissible control strategy for the N banks over the time interval [t, T ]. We denote by At this
set of admissible strategies.
In the search for Nash equilibria, for each bank i, we assume that the banks j 6= i chose their
strategies α−i,t for the future [t, T ], in which case, bank i’s should choose a strategy αi,t ∈ Ai,t
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in order to try to minimize its objective function J i(t, x, α, (αi,t, α−i,t)). As a result we define
the value function V i(t, x, α, α−i,t) of bank i by:
V i(t, x, α, α−i,t) = inf
αi,t∈Ai,t
J i(t, x, α, (αi,t, α−i,t)). (49)
Because of the linear nature of the dynamics of the states, together with the quadratic nature
of the costs, we expect that in equilibrium, the functions J i and V i to be quadratic functions
of the state x and the past α of the control. This is consistent with the choices we made in the
previous section. Accordingly, we write the functions V i as
V i(t, x, α) = E0(t)(x¯ − xi)2 + 2(x¯− xi)
t∫
t−τ
E1(t, s− t)(α¯s − αis)ds
+
t∫
t−τ
t∫
t−τ
E2(t, s− t, r − t)(α¯s − αis)(α¯r − αir)dsdr + E3(t), (50)
where the deterministic functions Ei (i = 0, · · · , 3), are the solutions of the system (41–44) with
the boundary conditions (45). We dropped the dependence of V i upon its fourth parameter
α−i,t because the right hand side of (50) does not depend upon α−i,t.
The main result of this section is Proposition 1 below which says that any solution of the
system (47) of integral equations provides a Nash equilibrium. For that reason, we first prove
existence and uniqueness of solutions of these integral equations when they are recast as a fixed
point problem in classical spaces of adapted processes. This is done in Lemma 2 below. We
simplify the notation and we rewrite equation (47) for the purpose of the proof of the lemma.
We set:
ϕ(t) = 2
(
1− 1
N
)(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2
(
1− 1
N
))
and
ψ¯(t, s) = [E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)]1[t−τ,t](s)
so that equation (47) can be rewritten as:
αˆit = ϕ(t)(X¯t −X it) +
∫ t
0
ψ¯(t, s)(¯ˆαs − αˆis)ds
= ϕ(t)
(
(ξ¯ − ξi)−
∫ t
0
[( ¯ˆαs − αˆis)− (¯ˆαs−τ − αˆis−τ )]ds+ σ[W¯t −W it ]
)
+
∫ t
0
ψ¯(t, s)(¯ˆαs − αˆis)ds.
(51)
Summing these equations for i = 1, · · · , N , we see that any solution should necessarily satisfy∑
1≤i≤N αˆ
i = 0, so that if we look for a solution of the system (47), we might as well restrict
our search to processes satisfying ¯ˆαt = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
So we denote by RN0 the set of elements x = (x
1, · · · , xN ) of RN satisfying ∑1≤i≤N xi = 0,
and by H2,N0 the space of RN0 -valued adapted processes a = (at)0≤t≤T satisfying
‖a‖20 := E
[ ∫ T
0
|at|2dt
]
<∞.
Clearly, H2,N0 is a real separable Hilbert space for the scalar product derived from the norm
‖ · ‖0 by polarization. For a ∈ H2,N0 we define the RN0 -valued process Ψ(a) by:
Ψ(a)it = ϕ(t)(ξ¯ − ξi) + σϕ(t)[W¯t −W it ] +
∫ t
0
ψ(t, s)aisds, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, i = 1, · · · , N. (52)
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where the function ψ is defined by ψ(t, s) = 1 − 1[0,0∨(t−τ)](s) − ψ¯(t, s). We shall use the fact
that the functions ϕ and ψ are bounded.
Given the above set-up, existence and uniqueness of a solution to (47) is given by the
following lemma whose proof mimics the standard proofs of existence and uniqueness of solutions
of stochastic differential equations.
Lemma 2. The map Ψ defined by (52) has a unique fixed point in H2,N0 .
We now prove existence of Nash equilibria for the system.
Proposition 1. The strategies (αˆit)0≤t≤T, i=1,··· ,N given by the solution of the system of integral
equations (47) form a Nash equilibrium, and the corresponding value functions are given by (50).
In other words, we prove that
V i(0, ξi, α[0)) ≤ J i(0, ξi, α[0), (αi, αˆ−i)),
for any αi, and choosing αi = αˆi gives:
V i(0, ξi, α[0)) = J
i(0, ξi, α[0), (αˆ
i, αˆ−i)).
Notice that the equilibrium strategies which we identified are in feedback form in the sense that
each αˆit is a deterministic function of the trajectoryX[0,t] of the past of the state. Notice also that
there is absolutely nothing special with the time t = 0 and the initial condition X0 = ξ, α[0) = 0.
Indeed for any t ∈ [0, T ] and RN -valued square integrable random variable ζ, the same proof
can be used to construct a Nash equilibrium for the game over the interval [t, T ] and any initial
condition (Xt = ζ, α[t)).
Proof. We fix an arbitrary i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, an admissible control αi ∈ A−i for player i, and we
assume that the state process (Xt)0≤t≤T for the N banks is controlled by (α
i
t, αˆ
i
t)0≤t≤T where
(αˆkt )0≤t≤T, k=1,··· ,N solves the system of integral equations (47). Next, we apply Itoˆ’s formula to
V i(t,Xt, α[t)) where the function V
i is defined by (50). We obtain
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dV i(t,Xt, α[t)) ={
dE0(t)
dt
(X¯t −X it)2 + 2E0(t)(X¯t −X it)
(
α¯t − αit − (α¯t−τ − αit−τ )
)
+
N∑
j=1
σ2E0(t)(
1
N
− δi,j)2 + 2
(
α¯t − αit − (α¯t−τ − αit−τ )
) t∫
t−τ
E1(t, s− t)(α¯s − αis)ds
+2(X¯t −X it)
t∫
t−τ
[
∂E1(t, s− t)
∂t
− ∂E1(t, s− t)
∂s
]
(α¯s − αis)ds
+2(X¯t −X it)E1(t, 0)(α¯t − αit)− 2(X¯t −X it)E1(t,−τ)(α¯t−τ − αit−τ )
+
t∫
t−τ
t∫
t−τ
[
∂E2(t, s− t, r − t)
∂t
− ∂E2(t, s− t, r − t)
∂s
−∂E2(t, s− t, r − t)
∂r
]
(α¯s − αis)(α¯r − αir)dsdr
+(α¯t − αit)
 t∫
t−τ
E2(t, s− t, 0)(α¯s − αis)ds+
t∫
t−τ
E2(t, 0, r − t)(α¯r − αir)dr

−(α¯t−τ − αit−τ )
 t∫
t−τ
E2(t, s− t,−τ)(α¯s − αis)ds+
t∫
t−τ
E2(t,−τ, r − t)(α¯r − αir)dr

+
dE3(t)
dt
}
dt
+
N∑
j=1
{
+ 2E0(t)(X¯t −X it)(
1
N
− δi,j) + 2( 1
N
− δi,j)
t∫
t−τ
E1(t, s− t)(α¯s − αis)ds
}
σdW jt .
(53)
Then, integrating between 0 and T , using V i(T,XT ) = gi(XT ) (ensured by the boundary condi-
tions at t = T for Ek, k = 0, 1, 2, 3), taking expectation, using the differential equations (41-44),
using the short notation A1 = 1− 1N , A2 = 1 − 1N2 , and adding E
T∫
0
fi(Xs, α
i
s)dt on both sides,
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one obtains:
−V i(0, ξi, α[0)) + E(gi(XT )) + E
T∫
0
fi(Xs, α
i
s)dt = −V i(0, ξi, α[0)) + J i(0, ξi, α[0), α) =
E
T∫
0
{[
− ǫ
2
+ 2A2(E1(t, 0) + E0(t))
2 + 2q(E1(t, 0) + E0(t)) +
q2
2
]
(X¯t −X it)2
+2E0(t)(X¯t −X it)
(
(α¯t − αit)− (α¯t−τ − αit−τ )
)
+ σ2E0(t)
N∑
j=1
(
1
N
− δi,j)2
+2
(
α¯t − αit − (α¯t−τ − αit−τ )
) t∫
t−τ
E1(t, s− t)(α¯s − αis)ds
+2(X¯t −X it)
t∫
t−τ
[
2A2
(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2A2
)
(E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t))
]
(α¯s − αis)ds
+2(X¯t −X it)E1(t, 0)(α¯t − αit)− 2(X¯t −X it)E1(t,−τ)(α¯t−τ − αit−τ )
+
t∫
t−τ
t∫
t−τ
[
2A2 (E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)) (E2(t, r − t, 0) + E1(t, r − t))
]
(α¯s − αis)(α¯r − αir)dsdr
+(α¯t − αit)
 t∫
t−τ
E2(t, s− t, 0)(α¯s − αis)ds+
t∫
t−τ
E2(t, 0, r − t)(α¯r − αir)dr

−(α¯t−τ − αit−τ )
 t∫
t−τ
E2(t, s− t,−τ)(α¯s − αis)ds+
t∫
t−τ
E2(t,−τ, r − t)(α¯r − αir)dr

−A1σ2E0(t) + 1
2
(αit)
2 − qαit(X¯t −X it) +
ǫ
2
(X¯t −X it)2
}
dt. (54)
Observe that the terms in ǫ cancel, the terms in σ2 cancel, and the terms involving delayed
controls cancel using symmetries and boundary conditions (45) for the functions Ek’s.
Next, motivated by (47), we rearrange the terms left in (54) so that the square of
αit−2A1
[(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2A1
)
(X¯t −X it) +
∫ t
t−τ
[E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)] ( ¯ˆαs − αˆis)ds
]
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appears first. We obtain
−V i(0, ξi, α[0)) + J i(0, ξi, α[0), α) =
E
T∫
0
{
1
2
(
αit − 2A1
[(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2A1
)
(X¯t −X it)
+
∫ t
t−τ
[E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)] ( ¯ˆαs − αˆis)ds
])2
+(X¯t −X it)2
[
−2[A1(E1(t, 0) + E0(t) + q
2
]2 + 2A2(E1(t, 0) + E0(t))
2 + 2q(E1(t, 0) + E0(t)) +
q2
2
]
+(X¯t −X it)
[
2αit[A1(E1(t, 0) + E0(t)] + 2(E1(t, 0) + E0(t))(α¯t − αit)
]
+(X¯t −X it)
(∫ t
t−τ
(E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)(α¯s − αis)ds
)[
−4A1
(
A1(E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2
)
+4A2
(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2A2
)]
+
(∫ t
t−τ
(E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)(α¯s − αis)ds
)[
2A1α
i
t + 2(α¯t − αit)
]
+
(∫ t
t−τ
(E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)(α¯s − αis)ds
)2 [−2A21 + 2A2]
}
dt. (55)
Using A2 = A
2
1 +
2
N
A1 and the relation α¯t − αit = 1N
∑
j 6=i
αjt −A1αit, we simplify (55) to obtain:
−V i(0, ξi, α[0)) + J i(0, ξi, α[0), α) =
E
T∫
0
{
1
2
(
αit − 2A1
[(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2A1
)
(X¯t −X it)
+
∫ t
t−τ
[E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)] ( ¯ˆαs − αˆis)ds
])2
+(X¯t −X it)2
[
4
N
A1(E1(t, 0) + E0(t))
2 +
2q
N
(E1(t, 0) + E0(t))
]
+(X¯t −X it)
 2
N
∑
j 6=i
αjt (E1(t, 0) + E0(t))

+(X¯t −X it)
(∫ t
t−τ
(E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)(α¯s − αis)ds
)[
8
N
A1(E1(t, 0) + E0(t)) +
2q
N
]
+
(∫ t
t−τ
(E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)(α¯s − αis)ds
) 2
N
∑
j 6=i
αjt

+
(∫ t
t−τ
(E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)(α¯s − αis)ds
)2 [
4
N
A1
]}
dt. (56)
Now, assuming that the players j 6= i are using the strategies αˆjt given by (47), the quantity
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∑
j 6=i
αjt becomes
∑
j 6=i
αˆjt = −2A1
[(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2A1
)
(X¯t −X it)
+
∫ t
t−τ
[E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)] ( ¯ˆαs − αˆis)ds
]
.
Plugging this last expression in (56), one sees that the terms after the square cancel and we get
−V i(0, ξi, α[0)) + J i(0, ξi, α[0), (αi, αˆ−i)) =
E
T∫
0
{
1
2
(
αit − 2A1
[(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2A1
)
(X¯t −X it)
+
∫ t
t−τ
[E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)] ( ¯ˆαs − αˆis)ds
])2}
dt.
(57)
Consequently V i(0, ξi, α[0)) ≤ J i(0, ξi, α[0), (αi, αˆ−i)), and choosing αi = αˆi leads to
V i(0, ξi, α[0)) = J
i(0, ξi, α[0), (αˆ
i, αˆ−i)).
6 Financial Implications and Numerical Illustration
The main finding is that taking into account repayment with delay does not change the fact that
the central bank providing liquidity is acting as a clearing house in all the Nash equilibria we
identified (open-loop in Section 3 or closed-loop in Sections 4 and 5).
The delay time, that is the single repayment maturity τ that we considered in this paper,
controls the liquidity provided by borrowing and lending. The two extreme case are:
1. No borrowing/lending: τ = 0:
In that case, no liquidity is provided and the log-reserves X it follow independent Brownian
motions.
2. No repayment: τ ≥ T :
This is the case studied previously in Carmona et al. [2015] and summarized in Section 2.
The rate of liquidity (the speed at which money is flowing through the system) is given by[
q + (1 − 1
N
)φt
]
as shown in equation (12).
3. Intermediate regime 0 < τ < T :
We conjecture that the rate of liquidity is monotone in τ . For instance, in the case of
the close-loop equilibrium obtained in Section 5 given by (47), the rate of liquidity is
[2E1(t, 0) + 2E0(t) + q] where the function E1 and E0 are solutions to the system (41–43).
These solutions are not given by closed form formulas. We computed them numerically.
We show in Figure 1 that as expected, liquidity increases as τ increases. This is clear
for values of τ which are small relative to the time horizon T . For values of τ which are
large and comparable with T , the boundary effect becomes more important as oscillations
propagate backward.
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Figure 1: Liquidity as a function of the delay time τ . The parameters are T = 20, q = 1, ε = 2,
and c = 0.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Assuming that (Xˇ, Yˇ , (Zˇk)k=1,··· ,N ) is given as an input, we solve the system (29) for
λ = λ0 and the processes φt, ψ
k
t , rt and the random variable ζ replaced according to the
prescriptions:
φt ← φt + κ
[
Yˇt− < ˜ˇY [t] + qXˇ[t], θ >]
ψkt ← ψkt + κ
[
Zˇkt + σ(
1
N
− δi,k)
]
, k = 1, · · · , N
rt ← rt + κ
[
Xˇt +
(
1− 1
N
)[
q ˜ˇY t + (q2 − ǫ) Xˇt]]
ζ ← ζ + κ[−XˇT + c(1− 1
N
)XˇT
]
,
and denote the solution by (X,Y, (Zk)k=1,··· ,N). In this way, we defined a mapping
Φ : (Xˇ, Yˇ , (Zˇk)k=1,··· ,N )→ Φ(Xˇ, Yˇ , (Zˇk)k=1,··· ,N ) = (X,Y, (Zk)k=1,··· ,N),
and the proof consists in proving that the latter is a contraction for small enough κ > 0.
Consider (X̂, Ŷ , (Ẑk)k=1,··· ,N ) = (X−X ′, Y−Y ′, (Zk−Zk′)k=1,··· ,N) where (X,Y, (Zk)k=1,··· ,N)
and (X ′, Y ′, (Zk
′
)k=1,··· ,N) are the corresponding image using inputs (Xˇ, Yˇ , (Zˇ
k)k=1,··· ,N ) and
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(Xˇ ′, Yˇ ′, (Zˇk′)k=1,··· ,N ). We obtain
dX̂t =
[−(1− λ0)Ŷt − λ0 < ˜̂Y [t] + qX̂[t], θ > +κ[ ̂ˇYt− < ˜ˇ̂Y [t] + q ̂ˇX [t], θ >]]dt
+
N∑
k=1
[−(1− λ0)Ẑkt + κ ̂ˇZkt ]dW kt
dŶt =
[−(1− λ0)X̂t + λ0(1− 1
N
)[
q
˜̂
Y t + (q
2 − ǫ)X̂t
]
+ κ
[ ̂ˇXt + (1− 1
N
)[
q
˜ˇ̂
Y t + (q
2 − ǫ) ̂ˇXt]]]dt
+
N∑
k=1
Ẑkt dW
k
t , (58)
with initial condition X̂0 = 0 and terminal conditions ŶT = (1 − λ0)X̂T + λ0c
(
1 − 1
N
)
X̂T −
κ ̂ˇXT + κc(1 − 1N ) ̂ˇXT and Ŷt = 0 for t ∈ (T, T + τ ] in the case of c > 0, and ŶT = 0 and Ŷt = 0
for t ∈ (T, T + τ ] in the case of c = 0. As we stated in the text, we only give the proof in the
case c = 0 to simplify the notation. The proof of the case c > 0 is a easy modification. Using
the form of the terminal condition and Itoˆ’s formula, we get
0 = E[ŶT X̂T ]
= E
∫ T
0
{
Ŷt
[
− (1− λ0)Ŷt − λ0 < ˜̂Y [t] + qX̂[t], θ > +κ[ ̂ˇYt− < ˜ˇ̂Y [t] + q ̂ˇX [t], θ >]]
+X̂t
[
− (1− λ0)X̂t + λ0
(
1− 1
N
)[
q
˜̂
Y t + (q
2 − ǫ)X̂t
]
+ κ
[ ̂ˇXt + (1− 1
N
)[
q
˜ˇ̂
Y t + (q
2 − ǫ) ̂ˇXt]]]
−(1− λ0)
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2 + κ
N∑
k=1
Ẑkt
̂ˇZkt}dt (59)
= −(1− λ0)E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2dt− λ0E
∫ T
0
Ŷt <
˜̂
Y [t] + qX̂[t], θ > dt+ κE
∫ T
0
Ŷt
[ ̂ˇYt− < ˜ˇ̂Y [t] + q ̂ˇX [t], θ >]dt
−(1− λ0)E
∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt+ λ0
(
1− 1
N
)
E
∫ T
0
X̂t
[
q
˜̂
Y t + (q
2 − ǫ)X̂t
]
dt
+κE
∫ T
0
X̂t
[ ̂ˇXt + (1− 1
N
)[
q
˜ˇ̂
Y t + (q
2 − ǫ) ̂ˇXt]]dt
−(1− λ0)E
∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt+ κ
N∑
k=1
Ẑkt
̂ˇZkt dt (60)
and rearranging the terms we find:
(1− λ0)
[
E
∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt+ E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2dt+ E
∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2 dt
]
= κE
∫ T
0
X̂t
̂ˇXtdt− λ0E∫ T
0
Ŷt <
˜̂
Y [t] + qX̂[t], θ > dt+ κE
∫ T
0
Ŷt
[ ̂ˇYt− < ˜ˇ̂Y [t] + q ̂ˇX [t], θ >]dt
+λ0
(
1− 1
N
)
E
∫ T
0
X̂t
[
q
˜̂
Y t + (q
2 − ǫ)X̂t
]
dt
+κ
(
1− 1
N
)
E
∫ T
0
X̂t
[
q
˜ˇ̂
Y t + (q
2 − ǫ) ̂ˇXt]]dt+ κE∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
Ẑkt
̂ˇZkt dt
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Letting µ = ǫ(1− 1
N
)− q2(1− 12N )2 > 0, we obtain:
(1− λ0 + λ0µ)E
∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt+ (1− λ0)E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2dt+ (1− λ0)E
∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt
≤ κE
∫ T
0
Ŷt
[ ̂ˇYt− < ˜ˇ̂Y [t] + q ̂ˇX [t], θ >]dt
+κ
(
1− 1
N
)
E
∫ T
0
((
q2 − ǫ) ̂ˇXt + q ˜ˇ̂Y t)X̂tdt+ κE∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
Ẑkt
̂ˇZkt dt,
and a straightforward computation using repeatedly Cauchy–Schwarz and Jensen’s inequalities
leads to the existence of a positive constant K1 such that
(1− λ0 + λ0µ)E
∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt+ (1− λ0)E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2dt+ (1− λ0)E
∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt
≤ κK1
{
E
∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt+ E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2dt+ E
∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt
+E
∫ T
0
| ̂ˇXt|2dt+ E∫ T
0
| ̂ˇY t|2dt+ E∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
| ̂ˇZkt |2dt}.
Referring to Bensoussan et al. [2015], applying Itoˆ’s formula to |X̂t|2 and |Ŷt|2, Gronwall’s
inequality, and again Cauchy-Schwarz and Jensen’s inequalities, owing to 0 ≤ λ0 ≤ 1, we obtain
a constant K2 > 0 independent of λ0 so that
sup
0≤t≤T
E|X̂t|2 ≤ κK2
{
E
∫ T
0
| ̂ˇXt|2 + | ̂ˇY t|2 + N∑
k=1
| ̂ˇZkt |2dt
}
+K2
{
E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2 +
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt
}
,
E
∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt ≤ κK2T
{
E
∫ T
0
| ̂ˇXt|2 + | ̂ˇY t|2 + N∑
k=1
| ̂ˇZkt |2dt
}
+K2T
{
E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2 +
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt
}
,
E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2 +
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt ≤ κK2
{
E
∫ T
0
| ̂ˇXt|2 + | ̂ˇY t|2 + N∑
k=1
| ̂ˇZkt |2dt
}
+K2E
∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt. (61)
By using (61), there exists 0 < µ′ < µ/K2 such that
λ0µ
′K2E
∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt
≥ λ0µ′
(
E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2 +
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt
)
− λ0µ′κK2
{
E
∫ T
0
| ̂ˇXt|2 + | ̂ˇY t|2 + N∑
k=1
| ̂ˇZkt |2dt
}
≥ λ0µ′
(
E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2 +
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt
)
− µ′κK2
{
E
∫ T
0
| ̂ˇXt|2 + | ̂ˇY t|2 + N∑
k=1
| ̂ˇZkt |2dt
}
(62)
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Therefore, we have(
1− λ0 + λ0(µ−K2µ′)
)
E
∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt
+(1− λ0 + λ0µ′)E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2dt+ (1− λ0 + λ0µ′)E
∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt
≤ κK1
{
E
∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt+ E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2dt+ E
∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt
+E
∫ T
0
| ̂ˇXt|2dt+ E∫ T
0
| ̂ˇY t|2dt+ E∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
| ̂ˇZkt |2}
+κK2µ
′
{
E
∫ T
0
| ̂ˇXt|2dt+ E∫ T
0
| ̂ˇY t|2dt+ E∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
| ̂ˇZkt |2dt
}
.
(63)
Note that since µ − K2µ′ and µ′ stay in positive, we have (1 − λ0 + λ0(µ − K2µ′)) ≥ µ′′ and
(1− λ0 + λ0µ′) ≥ µ′′ where for some µ′′ > 0. Combining the inequalities (61-63), we obtain
E
∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt+ E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2dt+ E
∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt
≤ κK
(
E
∫ T
0
| ̂ˇXt|2dt+ E∫ T
0
| ̂ˇY t|2dt+ E∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
| ̂ˇZkt |2dt
)
,
(64)
where the constant K depends upon µ′, µ′′, K1, K2, and T . Hence, Φ is a strict contraction for
sufficiently small κ.
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